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Abstract
Market data for financial studies typically derives from either historical transactions or
contemporaneous surveys of sentiment and perceptions. The research communities
analyzing data from these opposing categories of source data see themselves as
distinct, with advantages not shared by the other. This research investigates these
latter claims in an information theoretic context, and suggests where methods and
controls can be improved. The current research develops a Fisher Information metric
for Likert scales, and explores the effect of particular survey design decisions or
results on the information content. A Fisher Information metric outperforms earlier
metrics by converging reliably to values that are intuitive in the sense that they
suggest that information captured from subjects is fairly stable. The results of the
analysis suggest that varying bias and response dispersion inherent in specific
surveys may require increases of sample size by several orders of magnitude to
compensate for information loss and in order to derive valid conclusions at a given
significance and power of tests. A prioritization of quality of design, and the factors
relevant to survey design are presented in the conclusions, and illustrative examples
provide insight and guidance to the assessment of information content in a survey.
Keywords: Financial transactions; Information theory; Survey; Economics;
Mathematical models
Survey response paradigms
Market data for financial studies typically derives from one of two broad categories of
source material: (1) records and summaries of historical transactions offered from
sources such as Compustat, CRSP, government statistics, and raw market transactions;
and (2) survey data of sentiment and perceptions from a variety of demographics of-
fered from sources such as Harte Hanks, Valassis, Acxiom and Experian Simmons.
The research communities analyzing data from these opposing categories of source
data see themselves as distinct, with advantages not shared by the other. Survey data
researchers argue that they have access to relevant data on topics that are financially
important, but difficult or impossible to directly observe. Transaction data researchers
argue that their information is objective, since money has changed hands (Miller 1999;
Miller 2000). They may disparage survey datasets as potentially biased and lacking in
accuracy due to the subjectivity of responses and faults of measurement instruments
Bennett et al. (2012). Countering this, behavioral finance researchers who almost ex-
clusively rely on survey data contend that they have evolved methodologies and
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controls that mitigate biases. This research investigates these latter claims in an infor-
mation theoretic context, and suggests where methods and controls can be improved.
Likert scales represent a widely used approach to scaling responses in survey research,
such that the term is often used interchangeably with rating scale. Likert scales require sub-
jects to project qualitative or quantitative beliefs or opinions onto a discrete set of Likert
items – fundamental observations from such experiments – typically containing between
three and nine categories. The survey researchers’ challenge is to record subject responses
in mappings that are balanced, properly scaled, meaningful, informative, accurate and un-
biased. There is considerable discussion as to the exact meaning of Likert scaling
(Alphen et al. 2008; Bond and Fox 2007; Fitzpatrick et al. 2004; White and Velozo 2002;
Likert 1974). Likert scales are sometimes considered an implementation of a Rasch model,
though not every set of Likert scaled items can be used for Rasch measurement, but in
practice data has to be thoroughly checked to fulfill the strict formal axioms of the Rasch
model (Norquist et al. 2004, Bond and Fox 2007). Likert scale data can, in principle, be
used as a basis for obtaining interval level estimates on a continuum by applying the poly-
tomous Rasch model, when data can be obtained that fit this model. In addition, the poly-
tomous Rasch model permits testing of the hypothesis that the statements reflect
increasing levels of an attitude or trait, as intended.
Much of this uncertainty in application and interpretation arises from its history of
development. Rather than being a direct product of statistical modeling or measure-
ment theory, it was initially developed as an ad hoc, readily implementable method for
capturing otherwise unobservable ‘personal belief ’ information. Rensis Likert developed
the ‘Likert scale’ during his PhD thesis work in the 1930s (Likert 1974; Jöreskog and
Sörbom 1982). Since its development, the Likert scale has become popular and extensively
applied in survey research – in marketing, sociology, psychology and other fields – allowing
respondents to express both the direction and strength of their knowledge and opinions,
albeit couched in an artificial form and non-intuitive recording structure.
Open questions on the nature and interpretation of Likert scales make it difficult to as-
sess the adequacy of experimental or survey design, or generate reliable statistics concern-
ing the unobservable sentiments that Likert scales supposedly measure. Even were it
possible to consistently and accurately verify the truthfulness of subject responses, theory
is still lacking on ways to assess whether this is accurately translated into research conclu-
sions. Though we assume that there must be some information loss in translation from
presumably continuous personal beliefs to discrete and ordered response scales, the
causes and forms of loss have not been widely studied.
This paper contributes to the understanding of design trade-offs and requirements
which are required to be able to assert that a particular Likert sample contains a spe-
cific amount of information concerning the specific research question that the survey is
designed to answer.
Section 2 of this research reviews the prior literature, describing where the literature
has provided information measures for Likert scales, and where needed guidance in sur-
vey design and Likert response statistical analysis is still wanting. Section 3 applies a
standard Fisher Information measure of information content to Likert scales, and explores
the consequences of particular survey design decisions or results. Section 4 pro-
vides exact solutions with Gaussian beliefs, and these are compared and contrasted with
results from earlier work of (Srinivasan and Basu 1989) which also assumes Gaussian
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beliefs. Section 5 provides an example, comparing to Srinivasan and Basu’s (1989)
(Stevens and Galanter 1957) results which are often cited in support of survey statistics.
Section 6 discusses the implications of a Fisher Information criterion for Likert scale
interpretation, and draws conclusions germane to future survey design.
Prior research
Ordered categorical scales are widely used in marketing and the behavioral sciences to
measure a variety of human responses and performance. A metric z is ordered categorical if
it takes on a countable set of values {z1… zm} which are ordered such that zi > zj for all i >
j. Ordered categorical metrics are special cases of ordinal metrics where the numbers
assigned to categories are consecutive, and are not considered to be rankings (Srinivasan
and Basu 1989). Ordered categorical scales subsume a wide range of commonly encoun-
tered metrics; e.g., semantic differential scale ratings, such as the ‘luxuriousness’ of a car;
Likert scale responses, such as level of agreement with a statement about an attitude or per-
ception; and school assessment such as grades ‘A’, B’, etc.
Ordered categorical scales are almost always used to simplify the task of measuring a
completely or partially unobservable phenomenon, such as personal utilities associated
with usage of a particular product. With this justification comes an assumption that an
ordered categorical measurement will not be as accurate or desirable as the more pref-
erable continuous measurement, but that the simplicity and cost-savings inherent in re-
search implementations using ordered categorical metrics offsets the inaccuracies
introduced by using a less than perfect measurement instrument. The argument is typ-
ically made that any inaccuracies introduced by the ordered categorical simplification
of measurement can be counterbalanced with a larger sample size, and a regression to
means of the continuous population distribution as the sample size expands to infinity
(Stevens and Galanter 1957).
Unfortunately, there is little prior research that has explored the information loss –
and commensurate inaccuracies injected into a research study – that comes from sub-
stituting ordered categorical metrics for continuous metrics. (Srinivasan and Basu
1989) developed what they called an “index of metric quality” for an ordered categorical
metric Z that they called Iz implying that Iz somehow captured the information content
of Z (thus the I notation). They assume that random variable Z is a transformation of
some underlying ‘true score’ τ with the relationship X = τ + ε where X and ε (the error)
are both Normally distributed. This is a somewhat convoluted way of describing the a
situation where there are two measurement tools – an ordered categorical tool generat-
ing Z and a (hypothetical) continuous counterpart generating X where τ is unobserv-
able and ε is a measurement error, though (Srinivasan and Basu 1989) are not clear
whether error supposedly occurs in measuring Z or the (hypothetical) continuous
counterpart X or both. Thus the transformation is T : (X − ε)→ Z. They are also mute
on which of several correlation coefficients, for example ρ or r, should be used, though
it is made clear from the context that they intended to measure the coefficient of deter-
mination R2 , whose usual purpose is the prediction of future outcomes on the basis of
other related information. In case of a single regressor, fitted by least squares, R2 is the
square of the Pearson product–moment correlation coefficient relating the regressor
and the response variable.
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(Srinivasan and Basu 1989) define a metric in their study: “the descriptive measure of
the ability of Z or X to predict the ‘true score’ “τ which has value:
IZ ¼ r
2 Z; τð Þ
r2 X; τð Þ
They claim that Iz “provides an upper bound on the explanatory power (population R
2) of
multiple regression models in which the ordered categorical variable is regressed against a
set of predictors.” Interpreting their notation of R2 = r2(., τ) to mean a measure of the fit for
a particular sample, this implies that they are trying to measure the information content of
the (hypothetical) continuous predictors generating X with respect to the value of the or-
dered categorical variable Z as the “gold” standard of informativeness or predictive power
against which ordered categorical scales should be judged. Yet r2(X, τ) is dimensionless, and
therefore at best can only be used to assess relative performance of particular metrics. If the
value r2(Z, τ) is 90 % of r2(X, τ) that does not mean that Z captures 90 % of the information
in either X or τ. In fact, the general interpretation of predictive value or information content
associated with any particular r2(., τ) is not particularly meaningful. (Srinivasan and Basu
1989) also assume that IZ ∈ [0, 1] but if τ were in fact ordinal, one could envision cases
where values in excess of 1 could obtain. Nonetheless, it doesn’t seem unreasonable to as-
sume that continuous metrics will improve on prediction of ordered categorical metrics in
their system. A reinterpretation of their intention would be that they want to find the infor-
mation loss in using a measure Z(τ) instead of the more accurate and desirable X(τ). The
authors’ use of an R2 based metric inherently assumes a linear model with a single regressor,
fitted by least squares. This is a very restrictive set of assumptions, that we could reasonably
assume would be tested often when measuring human response, which, in turn, is notori-
ously non-linear. Fundamentally r2(., τ) is the squared correlation – the normalized version
of the covariance, obtained by dividing covariance by the standard deviations of each of the
variables. Correlations are dimensionless and range from − 1 to + 1. Several different formu-
las are used to calculate correlations, but the most familiar measure is the Pearson
product–moment correlation coefficient, or Pearson's correlation. Correlations are
simple to interpret and to compare to each other because of their normalized
range. Correlations between unobserved (latent) variables are called canonical (for
continuous data like X) or polychoric (for ordinal data like Z) correlation and are
distinct from the Pearson product–moment correlation coefficient that was used in
(Srinivasan and Basu 1989). Correlations provide useful summarizations of large datasets
into single metrics; unfortunately their parsimony comes which a significant loss of
information about the sample as (Anscombe 1973) demonstrated in Fig. 1.
An example of the correlation of x and y for various distributions of (x,y) pairs was
provided in Fig. 2 by (Brandstätter et al. 2002) which clearly illustrates how R2 summa-
rizations can mislead.
Clearly all of the scatterplots on the bottom row contain significant information
about Z, X and τ, but in all cases r2(X, τ) = 0 and for any positive value of r2(Z, τ) then
IZ =∞. Unfortunately, Srinivasan and Basu’s metric misrepresents the informativeness
– i.e., their “explanatory power of multiple regression models in which the ordered cat-
egorical variable is regressed against a set of predictors” – when those predictors and
categorical variables are about X and Z.
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Information metrics for likert scaled data
Srinivasan and Basu (1989) couch their information metric Iz in terms of the context of
a linear combination of unobserved Gaussian predictors X, and a Likert scaled observa-
tion Z. Because of the flaws inherent in using functions of R2 as information measures,
it seems productive to seek an alternative statistical measure of information that has
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Fig. 1 Anscombe's (1973) Quartet: Four Distinct Datasets with Identical R2
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been successfully applied elsewhere. Fortunately a widely applied measure of ‘informa-
tion’ exists in the form of Fisher Information which is applicable to both linear-least
squares contexts, and to highly non-linear, non-normal context using loss functions
other than squared error.
In mathematical statistics and information theory, the Fisher information (sometimes
simply called information) can be defined as the variance of the score, or as the ex-
pected value of the observed information. In Bayesian statistics, the asymptotic distri-
bution of the posterior mode depends on the Fisher information and not on the prior.
When there are N parameters, Fisher information takes the form of an N ×N Fisher In-
formation Matrix positive semidefinite symmetric matrix, defining a Riemannian metric
on the N-dimensional parameter space; in that context, this metric is known as the
Fisher information metric, and the topic is called information geometry. The metric is
interesting in several ways; it can be derived as the Hessian of the relative entropy; it
can be understood as a metric induced from the Euclidean metric, after appropriate
change of variable; in its complex-valued form, it is the Fubini-Study metric. Thus
Fisher Information offers a generalizable and mathematically consistent measure of the
‘informativeness’ of a Likert data item in measuring an underlying set of continuous pa-
rameters – the original goal of Srinivasan and Basu’s metric.
There is no loss of generality in assuming that the underlying values being measured
are a set of continuous phenomena. Such assumptions are widely found in consumer
and behavioral research where Likert scaled survey responses typically serve as the data
fed into classical statistical summarization and reporting models such as regression,
ANOVA, factor analysis and summarization models. More recently, it has become
popular to analyze Likert survey items with path analysis structural equation model
software such as AMOS, LISREL and PLS path analysis software where there is an im-
plicit assumption that multiple measurements need to be taken to, in effect, ‘triangulate’
an underlying latent or unobserved phenomenon. The classical approaches, in particu-
lar, were designed around measurements from astronomy, agriculture and physics, and
were not initially formulated for highly subjective, indirectly measured constructs such
as human behavioral, performance and opinion constructs. In these cases, it is common
to make implicit assumptions that the underlying opinions or beliefs of subjects – the
ones that are mapped into the Likert item data – are Gaussian distributed. Clearly a
Fig. 2 Pairs of random variables with correlations of 0, −1 and +1 (Brandstätter et al. 2002)
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five or seven value discrete scale will not be Gaussian distributed, but this is often as-
sumed to be a useful approximation. It is common to find authors finessing this as-
sumption by invoking Central Limit Theorem convergence, for example invoking
asymptotic conditions to justify this (e.g., consider the assumption that a random vari-
able ~x ∼Poisson (λ) ⇒ ~x ≈ℕ μ ¼ λ; σ2 ¼ λð Þ for λ > 20). They may alternatively make the
weaker and inclusive assumption that the discrete mappings of the Likert scale are ap-
proximations of the subjects’ continuous belief or value systems, which either in fact or
in convergence are Gaussian distributed. The latter assumption is often cited in the
modeling assumption where there are social science applications of the highly popular
LISREL, AMOS and PLS path analysis software packages.
On the other hand, there is a body of research that lends support to alternatives to con-
tinuous or Gaussian beliefs. For example (Kühberger 1995; Kühberger 1998; Kühberger et
al. 2002; Kühberger et al. 1999; Clarke et al. 2002) conclude that people do not generally
hold strong, stable and rational beliefs – that their responses are very much influenced by
the way in which decisions are framed, which might serve as a caveat in the design of sur-
vey instruments.
Where Likert scale variables are modeled as a response and predictor, it is possible to
use an ordered logit or probit model to handle the dependent variable; the independent
variable would be categorical. If the researcher is inured to the assumption of Gaussian
belief distributions, then it may be consistent to invoke the probit function or quantile
function associated with the standard Gaussian distribution. But in the context of
Likert scales, the logit model is probably philosophically more accurate (though in
practice there is very little difference between the two models). The logit model is
philosophically consistent with Likert scales for two reasons: The logit is also central to
the probabilistic Rasch model for measurement, which has applications in psychological
and educational assessment, among other areas. Though the modeling assumption of
Gaussian distributed beliefs is widespread, justifications for the assumption are difficult to
find. It may be that this has simply grown to be a research design convention, or is just
convenient. In particular in LISREL, AMOS, PLS path analysis it is unlikely that Central
Limit Theorem convergence is directly applicable given the structure of these models; nor
is it clear what sample sizes would be necessary to assure this convergence.
Likert data summarizing gaussian beliefs
With a choice of a Fisher Information metric, we can explore the implications of the
widespread assumption that survey subject beliefs or other phenomena are Gaussian
distributed, but are elicited, measured and analyzed as Likert scaled data. Consider fur-
ther the purpose of a Likert scale – to allow respondents to express both the direction
and strength of their opinion about a topic (Likert 1974; Jöreskog and Sörbom 1982).
Thus a Likert item is a statement which the respondent is asked to evaluate according
to any kind of subjective or objective criteria; generally the level of agreement or dis-
agreement is measured.
Likert scales are metrics on Likert items – i.e., mathematical distance functions which
define a distance between elements of a set; generally the level of agreement or dis-
agreement is measured. Survey researchers often impose various regularity conditions
on the metrics implied in the construction of their survey instruments to eliminate
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biases in observations, and help assure that there is a proper matching of survey results
and the analysis (Roberts et al. 2001; McArdle and Epstein 1987; Reips and Funke 2008).
A Likert item in practice is generally considered symmetric or balanced when obser-
vations contain equal amounts of positive and negative positions. The ‘distance’ be-
tween each successive Likert item is traditionally assumed to be equal – i.e., the
psychometric distance between 1 and 2 is equidistant to 2 to 3. In terms of good re-
search ethics, an equidistant presentation by the researcher is important; otherwise it
will introduce a research bias into the analysis. A good Likert scale will present a sym-
metry of Likert items about a middle category that have clearly defined linguistic quali-
fiers for each item. In such symmetric scaling, equidistant attributes will typically be
more clearly observed or, at least, inferred. It is when a Likert scale is symmetric and
equidistant that it will behave like an interval-level measurement (Akaike 1974) showed
that interval-level measurement better achieved by a visual analogue scale. Another
perspective applies a polytomous Rasch model to infer that the Likert items are interval
level estimates on a continuum, and thus that statements reflect increasing levels of an
attitude or trait – e.g., as might be used in grading in educational assessment, and scor-
ing of performances by judges.
Any approximation suffers from information loss; specifying the magnitude and nature
of that loss, though, can be challenging. Fortunately, information measures of sample ad-
equacy have a long history. These were perhaps best articulated in the ‘information criter-
ion’ published in (Ludden et al. 1994) using information entropy. The Akaike information
criterion (AIC) measures the information lost when a given model is used to describe
population characteristics. It describes the tradeoff between bias and variance (accuracy
and complexity) of a model. Given a set of candidate models for the data, the preferred
model is the one with the minimum AIC value (minimum information loss); it rewards
goodness of fit, while penalizing an increasing number of estimated parameters. The
Schwarz criterion (Pauler 1998; Dhrymes 1974) is closely related to AIC, and is sometimes
called the Bayesian information criterion.
Ideally, responses to survey questions should yield discrete measurements that are
dispersed and balanced – this maximizes the information contained in responses. Re-
searchers would like respondents to make a definite choice rather than choose neutral
or intermediate positions on a scale. Unfortunately, cultural, presentation and subject
matter idiosyncrasies can effectively sabotage this objective (Dietz et al. 2007; Dhrymes
et al. 1972; Lee et al. 2002). Cox (1980) to be more closely compressed around the
central point than Western responses; superficially, this suggests that Asian surveys
may actually yield less information (dispersion) than Western surveys. To improve
responses, some researchers suggest that a Likert scale without a mid-point would be
preferable, provided it does not affect the validity or reliability of the responses
Devasagayam (1999) Friedman et al. (1981) Friedman and Amoo (1999); Matell and
Jacoby (1972) Komorita and Graham (1965); Komorita (1963); Wildt and Mazis
(1978) Chan (1991) have all demonstrated that as the number of scale steps is in-
creased, respondents' use of the mid-point category decreases. Additionally, (Roberts
et al. 2001; McArdle and Epstein 1987; Reips and Funke 2008) (Dawes (2012) (Dawes
et al. 2002; Sparks et al. 2006) (Friedman and Amoo 1999; Allen and Seaman 2007)
have found that grammatically balanced Likert scales are often unbalanced in interpret-
ation; for instance, 'tend to disagree' is not directly opposite 'tend to agree'. Worcester and
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Burns also concluded that a four point scale without a mid-point appears to push more
respondents towards the positive end of the scale. The previously cited research concludes
that Likert scales are subject to distortion from at least three causes. Subjects may:
1. Avoid using extreme response categories (central tendency bias);
2. Agree with statements as presented (acquiescence bias); or
3. Try to portray themselves or their organization in a more favorable light (social
desirability bias).
Designing a balanced Likert scale (with an equal number of positive and negative state-
ments) can obviate the problem of acquiescence bias, since acquiescence on positively keyed
items will balance acquiescence on negatively keyed items, but there are no widely accepted
solutions to central tendency and social desirability biases. Likert items are considered sym-
metric or 'balanced' where there are equal amounts of positive and negative positions.
The number of possible responses may matter as well. Likert used five ordered re-
sponse levels, but seven and even nine levels are common as well. Allen and Seaman
(2007) concluded that a five or seven point scale may produce slightly higher mean
scores relative to the highest possible attainable score, compared to those produced
from a ten point scale, and concluded that this difference was statistically significant.
In terms of the other data characteristics, there was very little difference among the
scale formats in terms of variation about the mean, skewness or kurtosis.
From another perspective, a Likert scale can be considered as a grouped form of a
continuous scale. This is important in path analysis, since you implicitly treat the vari-
able as if it were continuous for correlational analysis. Likert scales are clearly ordered
category scales, as required for correlational work, but the debate among methodolo-
gists is whether they can be treated as equal interval scales.
When a Likert scale approximates an interval-level measurement, we can summarize
the central tendency of responses using either the median or the mode, with ‘dispersion’
measured by standard deviations, quartiles or percentiles. Characteristics of the sample
can be obtained from non-parametric tests such as a chi-squared test, Mann–Whitney
test, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, or Kruskal–Wallis test (Jamieson 2004; Chan et al.
2000; Hill 1995).
Likert mappings may also be analyzed with respect to their resolution or granularity
of measurement. Clearly a nine-point scale mapping has more resolution (or finer
granularity) than a three point one. Measurement in research consists in assigning
numbers to entities otherwise called concepts in compliance with a set of rules. These
concepts may be ‘physical’, ‘psychological’ and ‘social’. The concept length is physical.
But the question remains, 'if I report length as 6 feet in a case, what exactly does that
mean? Even with physical scales, there is an implied granularity; if I say that something
is 6 feet long, this implies less precision than length of 183 centimeters. In scientific
pursuits, finer granularities can be pursued to almost unimaginable levels – for
example, the international standard for length, adopted in 1960, is derived from the
2p10-5d5 radiation wavelength of the noble gas Krypton-86. The influence of choice
of measuring stick on the results of modeling is responsible for phenomena such as
Benford's Law (Mandelbrot 1982) and fractal scaling (Mandelbrot 1982, Burns and
Bush 2000).
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The assumption of Gaussian distribution of opinions or beliefs is common in the ana-
lysis of survey research, as mentioned previously. The assumption tends to be applied
in the analysis stage, rather than in the design of the survey instrument. The question
of whether underlying beliefs are continuous or discrete, distributed one way or an-
other doesn’t tend to come up in the design of Likert scaled surveys, because there a
few conventions that could use this information to improve the survey design. None-
theless, the current research will argue that it matters in assessing the informativeness
of Likert scaled data, which in turn can have a large impact on significance, power and
other statistics reported from the research.
Information clearly is lost in the mapping of beliefs to a Likert scale; how much informa-
tion is lost is probably unknowable in practice. But the loss in information from that that
would exist if our modeling assumptions (e.g., Gaussian beliefs) were actually true can be
assessed. At this point, let me more precisely define the concepts of (1) informativeness, (2)
bias, and (3) dispersion in Likert representations of survey subject belief distributions, start-
ing with graphical depictions of bias and dispersion in Figs. 3 and 4 respectively.
Figures 3 and 4, standardize Likert responses so that one standard deviation of the
actual distribution of beliefs will shift the Likert score one point higher – this is com-
parable to the process of keeping the survey instrument 'on scale' measuring beliefs in
similar units to the subjects normal conventions. In addition, the mode of subject
beliefs (i.e., what the largest number of people believe or agree upon) is presumed
to center somewhere in the range 2 through 4 of the 5-point scale, with all other
values being the 'extremes' – response '1' or response '5'. This is more or less what
survey researchers aspire to, where the level of agreement or disagreement is measured
(i.e. is 'on scale') and the scaling is considered symmetric or 'balanced' because there are
equal amounts of positive and negative positions (Kühberger 1995; Kühberger 1998;
Kühberger et al. 1999; Kühberger et al. 2002; Lydtin et al. 1975; Jöreskog 1971a).
Most of the weight of the Gaussian belief distribution should lie within the Likert
range 2 through 4 of the 5-point scale. Survey researchers can credibly move the
range around, but probably should not try to alter the subject beliefs if they are
trying to conduct an objective survey.
Weaknesses in data can be effectively addressed by increasing the sample size. This
works for multicolinear data, non-Gaussian data, and for Likert data as well. But since
data collection is costly, it is desirable to increase sample size as little as possible. The
path analysis literature is surprisingly vague on how much of an increase is needed.
(Jöreskog 1971b; Joreskog 1970) suggest increases of two orders of magnitude, but
without offering causes or mitigating factors. If we assume that survey costs increase
commensurately with sample size, then for most projects two orders of magnitude is
likely to be prohibitive.
For example, in the path analysis approaches implemented in LISREL and AMOS
software, for reasonably large samples, when the number of Likert categories is 4 or
higher and skew and kurtosis are within normal limits, use of maximum likelihood is
justified. In other cases some researchers use weighted least squares based on polychoric
correlation. (Jöreskog 1971b; Joreskog 1970; Jöreskog 1970; Jöreskog 1969; Jöreskog 1993;
Westland 2010) in Monte Carlo simulation, found phi, Spearman rank correlation, and
Kendall tau-b correlation performed poorly whereas tetrachoric correlation with
ordinal data such as Likert scaled data was robust and yielded better fit.
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Fisher Information (denoted here as Isample parameterð Þ is additive; the information
yielded by two independent samples is the sum of the separate sample's information: Ix;y
θð Þ ¼ Iy θð Þ þ Ix θð Þ. Furthermore, the information in n independent sample observations
is n times that in a single observation In θð Þ ¼ nI θð Þ . Assume a survey collects n inde-
pendent k − point Likert-scale observations for each of the survey questions. Let the Likert
scale represent a polytomous Rasch model, with say 5, 7 or 9 divisions (Alphen et al.
2008; Bond and Fox 2007; Fitzpatrick et al. 2004; White and Velozo 2002; Likert 1974).
We can take the perspective of a polytomous Rasch model, assuming that the responses
to the survey map an underlying Gaussian ℕ(μ, σ2) belief distribution to a Likert item
across the population of subjects surveyed for a particular question on the survey. A map-
ping of a Gaussian ℕ(μ, σ2) belief distribution to the k − point Likert-scale mapping
Fig. 3 Dispersion in balanced, unbalanced and mis-scaled Likert mappings
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imposed by the survey instrument might be visualized in terms of one of the four graphs
in Fig. 5.
In Fig. 5, survey responses are assumed yield an equidistant scaling of Likert items so
that one standard deviation of the actual distribution of beliefs will shift the Likert
score one point higher. In addition, the mean value of the mean of beliefs is presumed
to center somewhere in the range 2 through 6 of the 7-point scale, with all other values
being the 'extremes' – response '1' or response '7'. This is more or less what survey re-
searchers aspire to, where the level of agreement or disagreement is measured (i.e. is
'on scale') and the scaling is considered symmetric or 'balanced' because there are equal
amounts of positive and negative positions (e.g., see (Kühberger 1995; Kühberger 1998;
Kühberger et al. 1999; Kühberger et al. 2002; Jöreskog 1971a)). Most of the weight of
the Gaussian belief distribution should lie within the Likert support (we presumably
can move the Likert support around, but we probably should not try to alter the subject
beliefs if we are running an objective survey).
Fig. 4 Continuously varying strength of belief is approximated with 5 levels of Likert scale belief
Fig. 5 Mapping Subject Beliefs to a Likert Scale
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Let F(μ, σ) and f(μ, σ) be cdf and pdf respectively of the underlying belief distri-
bution. Presume we use a metric scale that sets σ2 = 1 (or alternately that the
Likert 'bin' partitions are spaced σ units apart). Let the Likert 'bins' of the multi-
nomial response distribution be the set x1∈ −∞; 1ð ð Þ; xi∈ i−1; ið f gk−1i¼2 ; xk∈ 1;∞ð Þð Þ
n o
where k is the total number of bins (usually 5, 7 or 9). Then the parameters {pi}
of the multinomial distribution of the 'bin' summing of Likert-items will be the set
p1 ¼ F 1ð jμf Þ; pi ¼ F ið jμf Þ−F i−1ð jμÞgk−1i¼2 ; pk ¼ 1−F k−1ð jμÞg.
A particular bin i is filled with probability of pi and not filled with probability 1 − pi; let
n independent survey questions result in that bin being filled θi times, and not filled n − θi
times. If Bi is a logical variable that indicates whether the i
th bin of the Likert item was
chosen, then all possible outcomes for the Likert item can be represented B1∨B2∨⋯∨
Bk−1 ¼ ∨k−1i¼1Bi since if none of the first k − 1 bin must have been chosen. Let the Fisher
information in the ith bin of a sample of n Likert items be IBi . Since Bi is a logical variable,
it can be perceived as a Bernoulli trial – a random variable with two possible outcomes,
"success" with probability of pi and "failure", with probability of 1 − pi. The Fisher informa-
tion contained in a sample of n independent Bernoulli trials for Bi where there are m suc-
cesses, and where there are n −m failures is:
IBi pið Þ ¼ −Epi
∂2
∂pi2
































































This is the reciprocal of the variance of the mean number of successes in n Bernoulli
trials, as expected. The Fisher information contained in a sample of n independent








Compare this to the Fisher Information in a sample of n observations from a Gaussian
ℕ(μ, σ2) belief distribution, which is estimated I^n ¼ nσ2 (and which incidentally is independ-
ent of location parameter μ as: I^n is the inverse of the variance). Then estimator ω^ can be















Thus the lower bounds on a sample that uses a Likert mapping will need to be
ω^ times as large as one that assumes a full Gaussian belief distribution. Figure 6
shows how a particular Likert scale mapping of what is an inherently continuous
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distribution of beliefs in the population results in a significant increase in the sam-
ple size needed for estimation – by a factor of at least two orders of magnitude
(i.e., 100 times). Figure 7 shows how mis-scaling varies with sample size.
There are three things that should be noted concerning multipliers for sample size
estimates for processing Likert data when an assumption of Gaussian data has been
made in the data analysis:
First, any difference of the actual sample standard deviation from the equidistant scale of
the Likert items requires larger sample sizes; but the minimum sample size for any Likert
mapped data set will be at least 100 times as large as that that would be required if you
had all of the original information in the Gaussian distribution of beliefs. The information
loss from using Likert scaling is at least two orders of magnitude.
Second, the sample is most informative when location of the Gaussian mean coincides
with the central Likert bin. This emphasizes the importance of 'balanced' designs for
the Likert scaling in the survey instrument.
Fig. 6 Unbalanced Likert mappings cause sample size increases by the multiple shown on the y-axis when the
central category on the Likert mapping is biased by the number of standard deviations shown on the x-axis
Fig. 7 Mis-scaled Likert mappings cause sample size increases by the multiple shown on the y-axis when
the standard deviation of the actual belief distribution is mis-scaled by number of Likert scale intervals
shown on the x-axis
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Third, information in the underlying belief distribution, which has a support, does not
depend on the mean of an assumed underlying Gaussian distribution of data. The
Likert mapping information content does depend on the mean and is sensitive to the
Likert scale being 'balanced' – this is controlled in the survey design.
Examples
In order to gain a more intuitive understanding of how the metric in this paper functions in
comparison with the (Srinivasan and Basu 1989) metric, we can operationalize the Likert
mapping as a survey instrument T⊗ S that ‘bins’ Y values (i.e., the measure of unobservable
underlying phenomenon X) into responses Z on a 5-point scale; T : X→ðY þ ~θÞ and S : Y
→ðZ þ ~δÞ. Random variable ~ε describes the error (information loss) in the mapping of sur-
vey instrument T⊗S : X→ðZ þ ~εÞ. Conceptually, ~ε ¼ ~δ þ ~θ where ~θ is the part resulting
from misspecification of the survey instrument (bias and dispersion) and ~δ is the part
resulting from approximating a continuous variable into the five bins in the Likert scale.
The seven sets of responses (including a restatement of Anscombe’s (1973) Quartet) in
Fig. 8 and Table 1, encapsulate several challenges – skewness, kurtosis, outliers, non-
informative data, and a non-linear (parabolic) data.
(Srinivasan and Basu 1989) evaluated the information content of Likert data item Z
(an m-point Likert scale variable) that approximates some continuous variable ~Y that
in turn approximates some unobservable belief or phenomenon that the researcher
wishes to measure. They assume that ~Y is composed of a true ‘score’ ~X and error ~ε
(which in their formulation is additive, but which we will allow to take on more com-
plex functional forms). Then in their formulation.
~Y ¼ ~X þ ~ε where ~X∼Nð0; 1Þ and ~ε∼Nð0; θ2Þ and ρð~X ;~εÞ ¼ 0
Thus ~Y ∼Nð0; 1þ θ2Þ and using the fact that the Pearson correlation coefficient is
invariant (up to a sign) to separate changes in location and scale in the two variables,
we can recompute the (Srinivasan and Basu 1989) information metric IZ ¼ ρ
2 Z;Xð Þ
ρ2 Y ;Xð Þ .
Since the correlation ρð~X ; ~Y Þ ¼ ρð~X þ ~ε; ~X Þ ¼ ρð~X ; ~X Þ þ ρð~ε; ~X Þ ¼ 1þ 0 ¼ 1 this metric
is identically IZ≡ρ2ð~Z ; ~X Þ.
A more general formulation allows ρð~X ; ~Y Þ∈½−1; 1: . Figure 8 (based on data in
Table 1) show five possible outcomes for ~X ; ~Y and ~Z . In case A, F and G ρð~X ; ~Y Þ ¼ 1
as assumed in Srinivasan and Basu’s formulation; in cases B, C, D and E ρð~X ; ~Y Þ ¼ 0:666.
Table 2 shows demonstrates two weaknesses of the (Srinivasan and Basu 1989)
metric IZ
1. the value often converges outside the purported [0,1] range of the statistic (as in
C,D, F and G) and
2. even small changes in survey setup, or of question interpretation by subjects can
have a huge impact on reported information content.
The Fisher Information statistic does not have a value when R2 = 1, but otherwise
converges to values that are intuitive in the sense that they suggest that information
captured from subjects is fairly stable.
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Conclusion and discussion
This paper contributes to the understanding of design trade-offs and requirements
which are required to be able to assert that a particular Likert sample contains a spe-
cific amount of information concerning the specific research question that the survey is
designed to answer. The research developed a Fisher Information metric and compared
this to an earlier correlation based statistic. Illustrative examples using Gaussian beliefs
showed that the Fisher Information metric is more informative, stable, and reliable than
earlier approaches. They also accentuate the importance of balanced survey design, po-
tentially without a midpoint, as suggested by (Devasagayam 1999) (Friedman et al.
1981) (Friedman and Amoo 1999; Matell and Jacoby 1972) (Komorita and Graham
1965; Komorita 1963; Wildt and Mazis 1978) (Chan 1991). It also suggests that where
grammatically balanced Likert scales are unbalanced in interpretation, the impact on
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Fig. 8 ~X  ~Y : Four Datasets with R2 = 0.666 and Three Datasets with R2 = 1
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Reips and Funke 2008) (Dawes (2012) (Dawes et al. 2002; Sparks et al. 2006) (Friedman
and Amoo 1999; Allen and Seaman 2007). The research found that any difference of
the actual sample standard deviation from the equidistant scale of the Likert items re-
quires larger sample sizes; but the minimum sample size for any Likert mapped data
set will be at least 100 times as large as that that would be required if you had all of the
original information in the Gaussian distribution of beliefs. The information loss from
using Likert scaling is at least two orders of magnitude. Additionally, the sample is
most informative when location of the Gaussian mean coincides with the central Likert
bin. This emphasizes the importance of 'balanced' designs for the Likert scaling in the
survey instrument. Finally, information in the underlying belief distribution does de-
pend on the mean and is sensitive to the Likert scale being 'balanced'.
Additionally, the research example identified a practical issue in the implementation
of the (Srinivasan and Basu 1989) metric IZ, in that its value often converges outside
the purported [0,1] range of the statistic (as in examples C,D, F and G) and that even
Table 1 ~X  ~Y : 4 Datasets with R2 = 0.666 and 4 Datasets with R2 = 1 binned into Likert variable ~Z
Case A
Case B Case C Case D
Observation Bin 1,2,3x Bin 1y Bin 2y Bin 3y
1x 1 y 1z 2x 2y 2z 3x 3y 3z
1 10.00 10.00 8.04 10.00 10.00 9.14 10.00 10.00 7.46 8.00
2 8.00 8.00 6.95 8.00 8.00 8.14 10.00 8.00 6.77 8.00
3 10.00 13.00 7.58 8.00 13.00 8.74 10.00 13.00 12.74 10.00
4 10.00 9.00 8.81 10.00 9.00 8.77 10.00 9.00 7.11 8.00
5 10.00 11.00 8.33 10.00 11.00 9.26 10.00 11.00 7.81 8.00
6 10.00 14.00 9.96 10.00 14.00 8.10 10.00 14.00 8.84 10.00
7 6.00 6.00 7.24 8.00 6.00 6.13 8.00 6.00 6.08 8.00
8 4.00 4.00 4.26 6.00 4.00 3.10 4.00 4.00 5.39 6.00
9 10.00 12.00 10.84 10.00 12.00 9.13 10.00 12.00 8.15 10.00
10 8.00 7.00 4.82 6.00 7.00 7.26 8.00 7.00 6.42 8.00
11 6.00 5.00 5.68 6.00 5.00 4.74 6.00 5.00 5.73 6.00
mean 8.36 9.00 7.50 8.36 9.00 7.50 8.73 9.00 7.50 8.18
std dev 2.15744 3.316625 2.031568 1.747726 3.316625 2.031657 2.053821 3.316625 2.030424 1.401298
skewness -1.01393 -8.1E-17 -0.06504 -0.40869 -8.1E-17 -1.3158 -1.58382 -8.1E-17 1.855495 -0.12334
kurtosis -0.20589 -1.2 -0.5349 -1.62132 -1.2 0.846123 1.743956 -1.2 4.384089 -0.45267
Case E Case F Case G
Observation 4x 4y 4z 5x 5y 5z 6x 6y 6z
1 8.00 6.58 8.00 10.00 8.00 8.00 10.00 5.33 6.00
2 8.00 5.76 6.00 8.00 2.00 2.00 8.00 4.67 6.00
3 8.00 7.71 8.00 13.00 17.00 10.00 13.00 6.33 8.00
4 8.00 8.84 10.00 9.00 5.00 6.00 9.00 5.00 6.00
5 8.00 8.47 10.00 11.00 11.00 10.00 11.00 5.67 6.00
6 8.00 7.04 8.00 14.00 20.00 10.00 14.00 6.67 8.00
7 8.00 5.25 6.00 6.00 -4.00 2.00 6.00 4.00 6.00
8 19.00 12.50 10.00 4.00 -10.00 2.00 4.00 3.33 4.00
9 8.00 5.56 6.00 12.00 14.00 10.00 12.00 6.00 6.00
10 8.00 7.91 8.00 7.00 -1.00 2.00 7.00 4.33 6.00
11 8.00 6.89 8.00 5.00 -7.00 2.00 5.00 3.67 4.00
mean 9.00 7.50 8.00 9.00 5.00 5.82 9.00 5.00 6.00
std dev 3.316625 2.030579 1.549193 3.316625 9.949874 3.842348 3.316625 1.105431 1.264911
skewness 3.316625 1.506818 0 -8.1E-17 -8.1E-17 0.052992 -8.1E-17 2.96E-15 0
kurtosis 11 3.151315 -1.11111 -1.2 -1.2 -2.22488 -1.2 -1.2 0.416667
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small changes in survey setup, or of question interpretation by subjects can have a huge
impact on information content reported by metric IZ.
In contrast, the Fisher Information estimator ω^ developed in this research only fails
to compute in the limiting case where R2 = 1, but otherwise converges to values that
are intuitive in the sense that they suggest that information captured from subjects is
fairly stable. The contrasting information in, say, American versus Asian consumer sur-
veys can be assumed to be comparable, even though the manner of conveyance and ex-
pression of that information may vary because of culture and other factors. This
reinforces conclusions rendered by (Cox 1980) concerning survey designs across
cultures.
Results from exploring the Fisher Information estimator ω^ developed in this research
imply that sample sizes need to increase to offset the mapping losses. The lower
bounds on a sample that uses a Likert mapping will need to be many times as large as
one that assumes a full Gaussian belief distribution, as in (Crook and Good 1980).
There are three issues that should be considered in setting the scope of a study with
Likert measurements. First, the minimum sample size for any Likert mapped data set
could be several orders of magnitude larger one that would be required if you had all
of the original information in the Gaussian distribution of beliefs. Second, the sample is
most informative when it is balanced and centered in responses. And finally informa-
tion in the underlying belief distribution is independent from the mean/mode μ, as long
as this is properly controlled in the survey design.
The assumption of Gaussian belief distributions may or may not be justified in prac-
tice. Studies by (Kühberger 1995; Kühberger 1998; Kühberger et al. 2002; Kühberger
et al. 1999; Clarke et al. 2002) have concluded that people do not generally hold strong,
stable and rational beliefs, and that their responses are very much influenced by the
way in which decisions are framed. This would tend to indicate that a class of distribu-
tions besides Gaussian distributions would be most appropriate for human beliefs.
Nonetheless, the Gaussian assumption is widely used, especially in survey research
using tools such as AMOS or LISREL. Widespread use of this assumption, and the
amount of information loss implies that sample sizes need to increase to offset the
mapping loss.
An alternative approach to assessing the informativeness of Likert items, with signifi-
cantly reduced demands on sample size, could invoke Bayesian conjugate families of dis-
tributions. Such an approach would essentially pool prior research findings (potentially
both qualitative and quantitative) in the prior distribution, with a likelihood function built
from the data. Given the categorical nature of Likert mappings, a multinomial-Dirichlet
Table 2 Information content of seven cases
A B C D E F G
IZ ¼ ρ
2 Z;Xð Þ
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conjugate family of distributions would be appropriate for Bayesian analysis of Likert sur-
vey data. Such approaches have been explored in the artificial intelligence and quality con-
trol fields (Dietz et al. 2007; Dhrymes et al. 1972; Lee et al. 2002) and statistics developed
in (Crook and Good 1980 Gupta 1969). So far, the multinomial-Dirichlet conjugate family
of distributions appears not to have been applied to the analysis of survey generated Likert
data.
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